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08SEOUL2388 2008-12-12 08:03 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET 서울 대사관

한국 회사와 파키스탄 미사일 프로그램 관련 개체들 간 계속되는 협력

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2388 3470803
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 120803Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2609
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0689

S E C R E T SEOUL 002388 Ⅱ급 비밀

SIPDIS SIPRnet - 미국 국방성, 국무성 인트라넷 - 에 공개

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2033 TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL PK KS SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN FIRM AND ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B), (C), and (D). 직원 조세프 Y. 윤에 의해 기밀처리됨. 사유는 1.4 (B), (C), (D)

¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 5. 이것은 조치 요구이다. 5단락을 참조하라.

¶2. (U) Poloff met Young-kul Koh of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) on December 10 regarding reftel. While Koh understood our concerns, he said that the ROKG did not uncover evidence supporting USG claims. Therefore, the USG would need to provide concrete evidence warranting ROKG action. 12월10일, 미 대사관 정치부에서 외교통상부 군축비확산 부서의 고영걸 협력관을 만났다. (관련 전문에 관해?) 고 협력관은 우리의 우려를 이해하지만 미국 정부의 주장을 뒷받침할 근거를 찾지 못했다고 말했다. 따라서, 미국 정부는 한국 정부의 행동을 보증하는 증거를 제공해야 한다고 했다.

¶3. (S) After poloffs communicated USG concerns about United Engineering in March 2008, MOFAT instructed its Embassy in Pakistan to investigate the firm and the end-use declaration filed by Sambu Korea Tek Co, LTD for the previous items it sold to United Engineering. Koh permitted poloff to review the Embassy report, which it submitted in August 2008. The investigation included a site inspection, interviews with management and employees, and photographic analysis. United Engineering's owner denied any linkage with Pakistan's Project Management Organization (PMO), which is involved in the development and deployment of Pakistan's HATF-III missile, which is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I system. Employees denied or did not know if United Engineering had any relationship to Pakistan's PMO. In addition, the previously purchased items, (the exported items were positively identified), were installed in the location and in accordance with the information in the end-use declaration. Finally, United Engineering prepared a physical site for newly ordered items (possibly lathes) in accordance with their proper installation and operation. 2008년3월에 미 대사관 정치부에서 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사에 대한 우려에 대해 전달한 후, 외교통상부에서는 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사에 대해, 그리고 삼부코리아텍 사에서 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사에 판매한 예전의 아이템들에 대한 최종 사용자 신고서에 대해 조사하라고 파키스탄 주재 대사관에 지시했다. 고 협력관은 2008년8월에 제출된 대사관 보고서를 미 대사관 정치부에서 심사하도록 허용했다. 현장 감시, 관리자 및 사원 인터뷰, 사진 분석 등이 조사에 포함되었다. 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사의 소유주는 파키스탄의 PMO(프로젝트 관리 조직)와의 관련성을 부인했다. 파키스탄의 PMO는 MTCR(미사일기술통제체제) 카테고리 I에 포함된 HATF-III 미사일의 개발 및 배치에 연관돼 있다. 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사의 직원들은 자사와 파키스탄의 PMO 사이에 어떤 관계도 없다고 부인하거나, 어떤 관계가 있는지 잘 모르고 있었다. 게다가, 이미 구입한 품목들은 (수출 품목들은 식별 결과 문제가 없는 것으로 드러났다?) 지정 장소에 설치되었고 최종 사용자 신고서의 정보와 일치했다. 마지막으로, 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사는 신규 주문 품목들을 위한 물리적 현장(선반으로 추정됨)을 준비해 놨고, 이 현장은 적법하게 설치되고 작동되었다.

¶4. (S) While the report noted that it could not exclude with 100% certainty that United Engineering was not a supplier to Pakistan's PMO, it was “highly likely that the imported items are used in accordance with the end-use declaration.” Given its investigation, Koh conceded that United Engineering may be using Intralink Incorporated as an intermediary to acquire the lathes. However, neither has the ROK uncovered nor the USG presented concrete evidence on Intralink's relationship to United Engineering, United Engineering's improper use of the acquired machinery, or United Engineering's relationship with Pakistan's PMO. 보고서에는 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사가 파키스탄의 PMO의 공급자일 가능성을 완벽히 배제할 수는 없다고 명시되었지만, “수입 품목들이 최종 사용자 신고서에 맞게 사용되었을 가능성이 크다”. 조사 결과가 나온 후, 고영걸 협력관은 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사가 인트라링크 주식회사의 중개를 통해 선반을 구한다는 점을 인정했다. 하지만, 인트라링크 사와 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사 간 관계가 어떠한지, 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사가 무기를 부적절하게 사용했는지, 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사와 파키스탄의 PMO 간 관계가 어떠한지에 대한 뚜렷한 증명은 한국도 미국도 내놓지 못하였다.

¶5. (S) Consequently, the ROKG requests the following: 이에 따라, 한국 정부는 다음 사항을 요구한다:

– Concrete evidence that the exported items would be used in ways contrary to the end use declaration or MCTR, since the items are not controlled by any of the multilateral control regimes. 수출된 품목들이 MTCR(오타?) 선언에 위배되는 방식으로 사용될 거라는 뚜렷한 증거. 이는 해당 품목들이 다자간 통제 체제에 의해 규제되지 않기 때문임

– Concrete evidence that Intralink is an intermediary for United Engineering. 인트라링크 사가 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사의 중개상이라는 뚜렷한 증거

– Concrete evidence on the type and nature of relationship between United Engineering and Pakistan's PMO. 유나이티드 엔지니어링 사와 파키스탄의 PMO 간 관계의 유형과 본질에 대한 뚜렷한 증거

STEPHENS

원문

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SEOUL2388 2008-12-12 08:03 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Seoul
 
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #2388 3470803
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 120803Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2609
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0689

S E C R E T SEOUL 002388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE TO ISN/MTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2033 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL PK KS
SUBJECT: CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREAN FIRM 
AND ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 123791 
 
Classified By: Joseph Y. Yun for reasons 1.4 (B), (C), and (D). 

¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 5.

¶2. (U) Poloff met Young-kul Koh of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) on December 10 regarding reftel. While Koh understood our concerns, he said that the ROKG did not uncover evidence supporting USG claims. Therefore, the USG would need to provide concrete evidence warranting ROKG action.

¶3. (S) After poloffs communicated USG concerns about United Engineering in March 2008, MOFAT instructed its Embassy in Pakistan to investigate the firm and the end-use declaration filed by Sambu Korea Tek Co, LTD for the previous items it sold to United Engineering. Koh permitted poloff to review the Embassy report, which it submitted in August 2008. The investigation included a site inspection, interviews with management and employees, and photographic analysis. United Engineering's owner denied any linkage with Pakistan's Project Management Organization (PMO), which is involved in the development and deployment of Pakistan's HATF-III missile, which is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I system. Employees denied or did not know if United Engineering had any relationship to Pakistan's PMO. In addition, the previously purchased items, (the exported items were positively identified), were installed in the location and in accordance with the information in the end-use declaration. Finally, United Engineering prepared a physical site for newly ordered items (possibly lathes) in accordance with their proper installation and operation.

¶4. (S) While the report noted that it could not exclude with 100% certainty that United Engineering was not a supplier to Pakistan's PMO, it was “highly likely that the imported items are used in accordance with the end-use declaration.” Given its investigation, Koh conceded that United Engineering may be using Intralink Incorporated as an intermediary to acquire the lathes. However, neither has the ROK uncovered nor the USG presented concrete evidence on Intralink's relationship to United Engineering, United Engineering's improper use of the acquired machinery, or United Engineering's relationship with Pakistan's PMO.

¶5. (S) Consequently, the ROKG requests the following:

– Concrete evidence that the exported items would be used in ways contrary to the end use declaration or MCTR, since the items are not controlled by any of the multilateral control regimes.

– Concrete evidence that Intralink is an intermediary for United Engineering.

– Concrete evidence on the type and nature of relationship between United Engineering and Pakistan's PMO. STEPHENS